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LIABILITY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW FOR DAMAGE
DONE BY CHATTELS
SCOPE OF STUDY

T

HIS study is limited to liability in common-law countries for harm
to persons and things caused by chattels, animate and inanimate,
through their own force undirected by any human being. The energy
which generates the harmful force may be kinetic or potential but it is not
directly supplied or released by any responsible agency. This limitation
excludes harm resulting from the activity of persons who employ chattels
as a means to accomplish harm to others or to things or who so utilize
chattels in the conduct of their activity that such harm results. Therefore, the study does not include the liability of those who use motor cars,
firearms, explosives, or other things in such a manner and for such a
purpose as to subject them to liability in tort whether for their intentional
or negligent misconduct or because they have engaged in an activity so
ultrahazardous as to render them liable for the accidental miscarriage
thereof. Neither does it include vicarious liability in any form. Within
its scope, however, is included liability for trespasses on land by domestic
animals and personal injuries by domestic and wild animals; harm caused
by explosives or combustibles not intentionally or negligently discharged
or ignited by a human being; and the escape of substances which, while
ordinarily harmless, become potentially harmful because collected in unusual quantities in artificial receptacles.
TRESPASSING ANIMALS

By English common law the possessor of certain domestic animals
becomes liable if they escape from his premises and intrude upon the land
of another.' His liability does not depend upon the harmful consequences
of the intrusion. The action is one for the trespass and requires no proof
of damage. The liability, however, includes all harm legally resulting
'Anonymous Case, 12 Hen. VII, Keilway, 3b; Cox v. Burbridge, (1863) 3
C. B. (N.S.) 430; Page v. Hollingsworth, (1885) 7 Ind. 317; Pittsburgh etc. R. Co.
v. Stuart, (1880)

71 Ind. 500; Stackpole v. Healy, (1819)

16 Mass. 33; Locke v.

St. Paul etc. R. Co., (1876) 15 Minn. 350; Tewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H.
518; Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger, (1848) 5 Denio 255, 49 Am. Dec. 239; Gresham
v. Taylor, (1874) 51 Ala. 505; D'Arcy v. Miller, (1877) 86 Ill. 102; McKee v.
Trisley, (1924) 311 Ill. 536, 143 N. E. 69; Bilea v. Parsley, (1889) 18 Ore. 47;
Tennessee Chemical Co. v. Hemry, (1904) 114 Tenn. 152; Hurd v. Rutland R. Co.,
(1853) 25 Vt. 116.
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from the intrusion.2 This liability in no way depends upon a lack of care
or diligence on the part of the possessor. He is liable although he employs
all the care and diligence which a reasonable man would think adequate
to prevent the escape of the animal. Liability is entirely independent of
fault. The possessor takes the risk of the inadequacy of his precautions.'
Although it was said in a leading case that this liability is imposed upon
the owner of any animal "in which by law the right of property can
exist", 4 it is clear that it is confined to a very few types of domestic

animals. The rule is applied to horses, 5 cattle, 6 hogs,' and sheep. 8 It is
not applicable to dogs9 and cats10 but it is applicable to domestic fowls."'
The rule does not apply to a possessor of animals who is properly driving
2

Decker v. Gammon, (1857) 44 Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99; Morgan v. Hudnell,
(1895) 52 Ohio St. 552, 40 N. E. 716, 27 L. R. A. 862, 49 Am. St. 741; Angus v.
Rain, (1820) 5 N. J. L. 815, 8 Am. Dec. 626; McKee v. Trisler, (1924) 311 111.
536, 143 N. E. 69, 33 A. L. R. 1298; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., (1874) L. R. 10 C. P.
10. See 32 Harvard Law Review (1919), at p. 420.
Such liability, however, is only for "consequential" damages. If there is no
trespass to land, there is no liability at all under this rule. See Warrington L. J.
in Manton v. Brocklebank, [1923] 2 K. B. 212, 226, with which compare Ellis v.
Loftus Iron Co., (1874) L. R. 10 C. P. 10. It is essential to prove scienter. Cf.
W. T. S. Stallybrass, Salmond on Torts (ed. 8, London, 1934), at p. 563.
sThe rule is phrased by the American Law Institute in its Tentative Draft of
the Restatement of Torts as follows: "Except as stated in § 505 [which relates to
a possessor of livestock driven on a public highway and straying therefrom], a
possessor of livestock which stray upon the land of another is liable for their intrusion
and for any harm done while upon the land to its possessor or a member of his
household although the possessor of the livestock exercised the utmost care to prevent
them from doing so" (Tentative Draft, no. 12, § 504).
4
CoX v. Burbridge (supra, n. 1).
5Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., (1874) L. R. 10 C. P. 10; Jones v. Witherspoon,
(1860) 52 N. Car. 555; Bulpit v. Mathews, (1893) 145 Ill. 345.
GTewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H. 518; Laws v. North Car. R. Co.,
(1869) 52 N. Car. 468.
7Walters v. Stacey, (1905) 122 Ill. App. 658; Mixner v. Lighthall, (1852)
13 Ill. 609.
8
Bileu v. Parsley, (1889) 18 Ore. 47, 21 Pac. 934.
9
Brown v. Giles, (1823) 1 C. & P. 118; Fisher v. Badger, (1902) 95 Mo. App.
289, 69 S. W. 26; Van Etten v. Norges, (1908) 112 N. Y. S. 888.
0
" Buckle v. Holmes, [1926] 2 K. B. 125, 54 A. L. R. 89. See, however, a
criticism in 13 Cornell Law Quarterly (1927), at p. 150.
"Adams Bros. v. Clark, (1920) 189 Ky. 279, 224 S. W. 1046; McPherson v.
James, (1896) 69 Ill. App. 337; Lapp v. Stanton, (1911) 116 Md. 197, 81 Atl. 675,
Ann. Cas. 1913, C. 755.
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them along a public highway ;12 in such a case his liability will depend upon
his lack of care in restraining them.' 3
Liability is based upon the possession of the animal rather than its
ownership. One is liable for the escape of an animal from his own land
if he is in the possession of the animal, although it belongs to a third
person. 14 On the other hand, he is not liable for the escape from his land
of an animal in the possession of a third person although he knows of its
presence on his land or, indeed, has given his consent thereto.' 5 So too,
one is liable for the escape of animals in his possession although they
escape from the land of a third person. 6 But the owner of animals is not
liable for their escape even from land of which he is in possession, if they
were in the possession of a third person at the time of their escape. 7
In the United States the original rule of the common law has had a
12 Tillett v. Ward, (1882) L. R. 10 Q. D. 17; Stackpole v. Healy, (1819) 16
Mass. 33; Wood v. Snider, (1907) 187 N. Y. 28, 79 N. E. 858; Erdman v. Gottshall,
(1899) 9 Pa. Super. 295; Cool v. Cromet, (1836) 13 Me. 250; Goodwyn v. Cheveley,
(1859) 4 Hurl. & N. 631. This immunity is available only as against an occupier of
land abutting on the highway over which the animals are being driven (Wood v.
Snider, (1907) 187 N. Y. 28, 79 N. E. 858, 12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 912).
'5 The non-liability of the possessor of animals which stray from the highway
exists only when the animals are being properly driven thereon for a legitimate
purpose. It does not exist with respect to a possessor who permits his stock to run
at large or graze along the highway (Stackpole v. Healy, (1819) 16 Mass. 33, 8 Am.
Dec. 121; Avery v. Maxwell, (1827) 4 N. H. 36; Dovaston v. Payne, (1795) 2
H. BI. 527).
14Moulton v. Moore, (1884) 56 Vt. 700; Tewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H.
518; Rossell v. Colton, (1858) 31 Pa. 525; Van Slyck v. Snell, (1872) 6. Lans.
(N. Y.) 299; Blaisdell v. Stone, (1881) 60 N. H. 507; Sheridan v. Bean, (1844) 8
Metc. (Mass.) 284. See Bacon's Abridgement, Tit. Tresp. G. 2; Comyns Digest, Tit.
Tresp. B.
15See Tewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H. 518; Sturtevant v. Merrill, (1851)
33 Me. 62. Certainly, the possessor of land is not liable because another's cattle
stray upon and then away from his land to the land of a third person (Pool v. Alger,
(1859) 77 Mass. 489; Cook v. Morea, (1870) 33 Ind. 497; Lawrence v. Combs,
(1858) 37 N. H. 331).
16"Liability is imposed upon the possessor of the livestock and not upon the
possessor of the land on which they are kept. Therefore, their possessor is equally
liable where as licensee or even as trespasser he keeps them upon land in possession
of a third person" (Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft, no. 12, § 504, comment b).
17Rossell v. Colton, (1858) 31 Pa. 525; Reddick v. Newburn, (1882) 76 Mo.
423; Mott v. Scott, (1905) 35 Colo. 68, 83 Pac. 779; Ward v. Brown, (1872) 64 Ill.
307. Contra, Sheridan v. Bean, (1844) 8 Metc. 284, 41 Am. Dec. 507. As to the
split of common-law authority on this point, the American Law Institute, in its
Tentative Draft of the Restatement of Torts, has adopted the rule stated in the text.
See Tentative Draft, no. 12, § 504, comment f.
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checkeied career. In a number of states the rule has been rejected
entirely on the grounds that it was inappropriate and unsuitable to local
conditions.'
This has occurred mostly in those sections of the country
in which cattle-raising was an important industry. On the other hand,
the rule has been adopted in a number of states in which, by reason of
their heavy population, this industry has been subordinate to manufacturing and the agricultural development of small farms. Thus, the English
rule has been held to prevail in Massachusetts,"9 New Hampshire, 20 New
York,2 1 Michigan,1 2 Indiana,"2 and Vermont 24 whereas it has been rejected
in Iowa,2 -' Nebraska, 26 Colorado, 2 7 California, 2 Arkansas, 29 Montana,8"
Texas, 3 1 Wyoming,8

2

Georgia, 3"

Mississippi, 3 4

and Missouri.'3

In some

states first one rule then another has prevailed,8 6 and in-others, legislation
has repudiated the rule,37 or re-enacted it.38
'sPerhaps the best discussion by a court which considers carefully the rule and
rejects it as unsuitable to local conditions is to be found in the opinion of Cobb J. in
Delaney v. Erickson, (1880) 10 Nebr. 492, 6. N. W. 600, 35 Am. Rep. 487.
10 Stackpole v. Healy, (1819) 16 Mass. 33.
20 Tewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H. 518.
21
Tonawanda R. Co. v. Munger, (1848) 5 Denio 255, 49 Am. Dec. 239;
Harrison v. M'Clellan, (1909) 118 N. Y. S. 513.
22johnson v. Wing, (1854) 3 Mich. 163.
"3Page v. Hollingsworth, (1855) 7 Ind. 317; Pittsburg etc. R. Co. v. Stuart,
(1880) 71 Ind. 500.
24Hurd v. Rutland R. Co., (1853) 25 Vt. 116.
25 Wagner v. Bissell, (1856) 3 Iowa 396.
2GDelaney v. Erickson, (1880) 10 Nebr. 492, 6 N.W. 600, 35 Am. Rep. 487.
2T Morris v. Fraker, (1880) 5 Colo. 425.
28 Waters v. Moss, (1859) 12 Calif. 535.
"Little Rock etc. R. Co. v. Finley, (1881) 37 Ark. 562.
3Blinhorn v. Griswold, (1902) 27 Mont. 79.
"Pace v. Potter, (1893) 85 Tex. 473, 22 S. W. 300; Land Co. v. McClelland,
(1893) 86 Tex. 179.
"2Cosfrieff v. Miller, (1901) 10 Wyo. 190.
"3Macon R. Co. v. Lester, (1860) 30 Ga. 911.
34Vicksburg R. Co..v. Patton, (1856) 31 Miss. 156.
35Bradford v. Floyd, (1883) 80 Mo. 207.
36Cf. Gresham v. Taylor, (1874) 51 Ala. 504, with Wilhite v. Speakman, (1885)
79 Ala. 400, and Sprague v. Fremont R. Co., (1888) 6 Dak. 86, with Bostwick v.
Minnesota R. Co., (1892) 2 N. Dak. 440.
' 7 Studwell v. Ritch, (1841) 14 Conn. 292; Chase v. Chase, (1880) 15 Nev. 259;
Poindexter v. May, (1900) 98 Va. 145; Blaine v. Chesapeake etc. R. Co., (1876)
9 W. Va. 252.
' 8 McKee v. Trisler, (1924) 311 Ill. 536, 143 N. E. 69; Bulpit v. Mathews,
(1893) 145 Ill. 345, 34 N. E. 525, 22 L. R. A. 55; Sloan v. Hubbard, (1878) 34
Ohio St. 583.
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In a number of states statutes have qualified the rule by requiring the
possessor of animals to fence them in as a condition to immunity,3 9 or by
requiring land occupiers to fence out his neighbour's animals as a condition to recovery, 40 or by providing a procedure whereby local officials may
assign certain portions of the boundary line between contiguous tracts of
land to their respective possessors for fencing. 41 These statutes permitting
boundary-line fences have no effect upon liability until assignment and
allocation of fencing obligations have been made by the proper official."'
Under such a statute the possessor of land who complies with the order
of assignment may recover for intrusions by his neighbour's cattle. "
The occupier who does not so comply may not recover unless the cattle
were owned by one other than the adjoining land-owner.44 If neither
complies it seems that a recovery may be obtained, especially if, aside from
45
the statute, the original common-law rule prevailed.
The rationale of the English rule was at first based upon the fiction
of identity of the possessor with the beast and the wrongful conduct of
the animal. 6 "Where my beasts of their own wrong", says an anonymous
39 See Barber v. Mensch, (1893) 157 Pa. 390, 27 Atl. 708; Frederick v. White,
(1874)0 73 Ill. 590.
4 Chase v. Chase, (1880) 15 Nev. 259; Heald v. Grier, (1882) 12 Mo. App.
556; Moore v. White, (1870) 45 Mo. 206; Wilhite v. Speakman, (1885) 79 Ala.
400; Woody v. Purdy, (1852) 20 Ala. 379; Comerford v. Dupuy, (1861) 17 Calif.
308; Frazier v. Nortinus, (1871) 34 Iowa 82; Page v. Hollingsworth, (1855) 7
Ind. 317; Clark v. Stipp, (1881) 75 Ind. 114; Darling v. Rogers, (1871) 7 Kans.
592; Prather v. Rewr, (1880) 23 Kans. 627; Britton v. Van Camp, (1810) 3 N. J. L.
240; Gooch v. Stephenson, (1836) 13 Me. 371; Gregg v. Gregg, (1867) 55 Pa. 227.
4"Cowls v. Balzer, (1867) 47 Barb. 562; Coxe v. Robbins, (1828) 9 N. J. L.
384; Bradbury v. Gilford, (1865) 53 Me. 99; Sturtevant v. Merrill, (1851) 33 Me.
62; Coxe v. Cavanaugh, (1872) 44 Vt. 268; Walters v. Stacy, (1905) 122 Ill. App.
658; Brown v. Sams, (1907) 119 Tenn. 677, 109 S. W. 513; Pool v. Alger, (1858)
11 Gray 489; Kobayashi v. Strangeway, (1911) 64 Wash. 36, 116 Pac. 461; Baynes v.
Chastain, (1879) 68 Ind. 376; Hin.e v. Munson, (1864) 32 Conn. 219.
42Thayer v. Arnold, (1842) 4 Metc. 589; Tewksbury v. Bucklin, (1835) 7 N. H.
518; Webber v. Closson, (1852) 35 Me. 26; Coxe v. Robbins, (1828) 9 N. J. L.
384; Rust v. Low, (1809) 6 Mass. 90.
43Walters v. Stacey, (1905) 122 I11.
App. 658; Brown v. Sams, (1907) 119
Tenn. 677.
44Wilder v. Wilder, (1866) 38 Vt. 678; Stafford v. Ingersol, (1842) 3 Hill 38;
Chambers v. Mathews, (1841) 18 N. J.L. 368; Lord v. Wormwood, (1849) 29 Me.
282; Jackson v. Rutland etc. R. Co., (1853) 25 Vt. 150; York v. Davis, (1840) 11
N. H. 241; D'Arcy v. Miller, (1877) 86 Ill. 102; Cowles v. Balzer, (1867) 47
Barb. 562.
45Roach v. Lawrence, (1883) 56 Wisc. 478; Myers v. Dodd, (1857) 9 Ind. 290.
46"Its origins may perhaps be found in a form of noxal liability. It was also
sometimes treated as a kind of vicarious liability: 'qui facit per equum' or 'equam'
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case of the reign of Henry VII, 7 "without my will and knowledge break
into another's close, I shall be punished, for I am the trespasser with my
beasts." Blackstone purported to find grounds for the rule in the negligence of the possessor.4 s Modern analysis refers legal responsibility to
the principle of liability without fault, 40 of which it seems all instances of
liability for damage caused by chattels are further illustrations.
HARM TO PERSONS BY DANGEROUS ANIMALS

"The law of England", observed a distinguished judge, 50 "recognizes
two distinct classes of animals; and as to one of those classes it cannot be
doubted that a person who keeps an animal belonging to that class must
prevent it from doing injury, and it is immaterial whether he knows it to
be dangerous or not. As to another class, the law assumes that animals
belonging to it are not of a dangerous nature, and anyone who keeps an
animal of this kind is not liable for the damage it may do unless he knew
that it was dangerous." This distinction is the foundation of the common
law as to liability for harm other than trespass to land caused by animals
in possession. The distinction between domestic animals and animals
ferae naturae, "as a lion, a bear, a wolf, yea, an ape or monkey", is noted
as well established in Hale's Pleas of the Crown.5 1

The possessor of a

wild animal must keep it at his peril; if it escapes and attacks another his
innocence of fault will be no defence. 52 It is immaterial that he believed
or 'per bovem facit per se', a doctrine emphatically rejected by Lord Sterndale
M. R. in Manton v. Brocklebank, [1923] 2 K. B. pp. 218-220. It is now based upon
the proprietary ground as involving an interference with possession, an application
of the maxim 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'. See Holdsworth, H. E. L. viii,
470-1, Bohlen, Studies, pp. 354-360" (W. T. S. Stallybrass, Salmond on Torts (ed.
8, London, 1934), at p. 560, n. y).
47
Anonymous Case, Y. B. 12 Henry VII. Keilway 3b.
48
Commentaries, 3, at p. 211. See also T. A. Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability (Long Island, 1906), vol. I, at p. 52.
49 See supra, n. 46.
50
Lord Esher, in Filburn v. Peoples Palace Co., (1890) L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 258.
511 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 439, part I, c, 33.
5
2Filburn v. Peoples Palace Co., (1890) L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 258; May v. Burdett,
(1846) 9 Q. B. 101; Vredenburg v. Behan, (1881) 33 La. Ann. 627; Marquet v.
La Duke, (1896) 96 Mich. 596, 55 N. W. 1006; Copley v. Wills, (1913) 152 S. W.
830 (Tex. Civ. App.) ; Hayes v. Miller, (1907) 150 Ala. 621, 43 So. 818, 11 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 748, 124 Am. St. Rep. 93; Opelt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., (1919) 41 Calif. App.
776, 183 Pac. 241; Jackson v. Baker, (1904) 24 App. D. C. 100; Warner v. Chamberlain, (1884) 7 Houst. (Del.) 18, 30 Atl. 638; Phillips v. Garner, (1914) 106 Miss.
828, 64 So. 735; Muller v. McKesson, (1878) 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123;
Andrew v. Kilgour, (1910) 19 M. R. 545; Shaw v. McCreary, (1890) 19 0. R. 39;
10 D. L. R. 143.
Conner v. Princess Theatre, (1912) 27 0. L. R. 466,
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that he had succeeded in taming the animal or that he had taken every
possible precaution against its escape." An exception is to be noted where
by statute the defendant is authorized or obligated to keep the animal.
This statutory privilege is available to relieve from the rules of strict
liability a zoological society, park, or other organization specifically authorized to maintain wild animals for educational purposes. 4
The same liability is imposed by the common law upon one who
harbours a domestic animal if, .but not unless, he knew or had reason to
know that the particular domestic animal was dangerous. 55 In such a case
he is subject to liability for its escape and subsequent attck upon one
other than a trespasser, in spite of reasonable precautions to confine the
animal.56 Thus, in the case of wild animals the dangerous character of
5

8Andrew v. Kilgour, (1910) 19 M. R. 545; Filburn v. Peoples Palace Co.,
(1890) L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 258. But note the contrary dictum in Conner v.Princess
Theatre, (1912) 27 0. L. R. 466, 10 D. L. R. 143.
54Gusci v.New York Zoological Soc., (1920) 192 App. Div. 263, 182 N. Y. S.
257, aff. (1922) 233 N. Y. 511, 135 N. E. 897; Jackson v.Baker, (1904) 24 App.
D. C. 100. An analogous privilege has been recognized in cases involving the rule of
Rylands v.Fletcher. See Madras R. Co. v. Carvetinagarum, (1874) 30 L. T. R.
770; Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., (1894) 70 L. T. R. 547. Sir John Salmond's
criticism of this restriction seems hardly justifiable (see ed. 7, at pp. 365-6). It
has been abandoned by Dr. Stallybrass in his 8th edition of that work.
55
Burton v. Moorhead, (1881) 8 Sess. Cas. (ser. 4) 892; Kittredge v. Elliot,
(1844) 16 N. H. 77, 41 Am. Dec. 717; Rider v. White, (1875) 65 N. Y. 54, 22 Am.
Rep. 600; Goode v. Martin, (1881) 57 Md. 606, 40 Am. Rep. 448; Montgomery v.
Koester, (1883) 35 La. Ann. 1091, 48 Am. Rep. 253; Evans v. McDermott, (1886)
49 N. J. L. 163, 6 At. 653, 60 Am. Rep. 602; Buckley v. Leonard, (1847) 4 Denio
500; Cockerham v. Nixon, (1850) 11 Ired. (N. Car.) 269; Murphy v. Preston,
(1887) 5 Mackey (D. C.) 514; Eddy v. Union R. Co., (1903) 25 R. I. 451, 56 Atl.
677; Le Forest v. Tolman, (1875) 117 Mass. 109; Reed v. Southern Express Co.,
(1894) 95 Ga. 108, 22 S.E. 133; Morgan v. Hudnell, (1895) 52 Ohio St. 552, 40
N. E. 716; Dufer v. Cully, (1871) 3 Ore. 377; Scott v. Grover, (1884) 56 Vt. 499;
Slinger v. Henneman, (1875) 38 Wisc. 504; Harris v. Williams, (1932) 15 Pac. (2)
580 (Okla.) ; Peltus v. Wwyel, (1920) 225 S.W. 191 (Tex. Civ. App.).
56
In a distinct minority of cases, negligence on the part of the possessor of the
animal seems necessary to liability. See Worthen v. Love, (1888) 60 Vt. 285, 14
Atl. 461; Hayes v. Smith, (1900) 62 Ohio St. 161, 56 N. E. 879; Vaughn v. Miller
Bros. "101" Ranch Wild West Show, (1931) 109 W. Va. 170, 153 S. E. 289;
De Gray v. Murray, (1903) 69 N. J. L. 458, 55 Atl. 237; Fake v. Addicks, (1890)
45 Minn. 37, 47 N. W. 450.
In some situations not falling within the rules of strict liability, negligence,
of course, may make the possessor of an animal liable. Thus, a domestic animal
although not abnormally dangerous, may have known propensities to inflict
harm under certain circumstances. Reasonable precautions in such cases must be
taken to prevent harm to others. See Parsons v. Mouser, (1903) 119 Iowa 88, 93
N. W. 86, 62 L. R. A. (N.S.), 132, 97 Am. St. Rep. 283, with note collecting cases
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the animal as a class is the risk against which the law affords protection.
In the case of domestic animals it is the dangerous character of the
particular animal and the scienter of its possessor that are the bases of
57

liability.

Here again attempts have been made to regard liability as predicated
upon fault. One of the most eminent of American judges, the author of
a classic treatise on torts, ascribed liability to this principle. 58 It is clear,
however, that this analysis will not do. Negligence at common law consists of an activity which subjects another to a risk of harm which it is
reasonable to create or, in cases of certain definite relationships, the
reasonable failure to adopt measures to prevent harm to another.5" In
both aspects of negligence it is the unreasonableness of the risk, the
impropriety or social undesirability of the defendant's conduct, whether of
act or omission, which is the liability-creating factor. This unreasonableness consists either in the impropriety of the conduct or the improper
manner in which it is carried on. Liability at common law for keeping
dangerous animals is independent of either of these factors. Thus, it is
not improper nor undesirable in many circumstances to harbour wild
beasts. Their confinement for exhibition purposes performs desirable
functions of education and wholesome entertainment. If such activities
are conducted in a proper manner with reasonable precautions, there is
no basis for the imputation of negligence merely because the precautions
turn out to be inadequate. So too, the keeping of ferocious dogs and
other domestic animals for the purpose of protecting human life and
property is in many instances not only justifiable but necessary. If care
is employed to warn innocent intruders and to prevent the escape of such
animals, there is no foundation for a charge of* negligence. Modem
writers and judges again refer this type of liability to the principle of
liability without fault.
Like the case of intrusion by a domestic animal, liability depends
upon its possession, rather than its ownership or the premises on which
it is kept, " unless one, who as occupier and possessor by tolerating dogs
on liability for negligently maintaining beehives near the highway. See also Earl
v. Van Alstine, (1850) 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 630; Ammons v. Kellogg, (1925) 137 Miss.
551, 102 So. 562, and annotation in 39 A. L. R. 360 following.
57
See Burton v. Moorhead, (1881) 8 Sess. Cas. (ser. 4) 892; May v. Burdett,
(1846) 9 Q. B. 101.
58Cooley on Torts (ed. 2), at pp. 410-1.
59

See Restatement of Torts, vol. II, §§ 282, 283, and 284.

"Negligence" in 29 Harvard Law Rcviezv (1915),

See also H. T. Terry,

at p. 40; Selected Essays on the

Law of Torts (Harvard, 1924), at p. 267.
6
"Burch v. Lowary, (1906) 131 Iowa 719. 109 N. W. 282; Auchmuty v. Ham,
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or other animals thereon, fails to exercise that care and caution for the
safety of his invitees which the common law enjoins. 6 ' The bailee of an
animal is subject to the same rules as the owner who keeps an animal on his
premises. Thus, a carrier in possession of an animal for transportation
is subject to the rule of strict liability, although there seems to be a
division of the meagre authority available.6 2 On the other hand, the
owner is not subject to the rule of strict liability if the animal escapes or
causes injury while in the possession of the bailee, although, of course, he
may be liable if he has negligently failed to warn the bailee of the
dangerous propensities of a domestic animal. This is true whether the
person harmed is the bailee himself or a third person. 6
Although at common law both in England and the United States,
scienter is required to subject the possessor of a domestic animal to
liability for harm to persons in the absence of trespass to land, it is to be
noted that if there is such a trespass, even it seems by an animal for whose
mere trespass there was no liability, the possessor is siibject to liability
for harm to persons or chattels although there is an absence of scienter.6 1
(1845) 1 Denio (N. Y.) 495; Frammell v. Little, (1861) 16 Ind. 251; Snyder v.
Patterson, (1894) 161 Pa. 98, 28 At. 1006; Slater v. Sorge, (1911) 166 Mich. 173,

131 N. W. 565; Mclntire v. Leland, (1918) 228 Mass. 348, 118 N. E. 665; Mc-

Loughlin v. Kemp, (1900) 152 Mass. 7, 25 N. E. 18; Miller v. Reeves, (1918) 101
Wash, 642, 172 Pac. 815; Whallen v. Wetzell, (1884) 6 Ky. L. Rep. 50.
The cases involving liability of a married woman for injuries inflicted by a
dog owned by her husband but kept on land owned by her may mostly be properly
regarded as cases of joint keeping or harbouring since the wife has consented to or
approved thereof. See Shaw v. McCreary, (1890) 19 0. R. 39; Hugron v. Statton,
(1900) Rap. Jud. Quebec 18 C. S. 200; Quiltie v. Bdttie, (1892) 135 N. Y. 201, 32
N. E. 47. In some cases, negligence may be shown (Hopper v. Crocker, (1919)
85 So. 843 (Ala. App.)).
61
See Andrews v. Jordan Marsh Co., (1933) 283 Mass. 158, 186 N. E. 71;
Gallagher v. Kroger Grocery etc. Co., (1925) 272 S. W. 1005 (Mo. App.); Smith
v. Great Eastern R. Co., (1866) L. R. 2 C. P. 4. But see Westcott v. Seattle R.
etc. Co., (1906) 41 Wash. 618, 84 Pac. 588.
62
Holt v. Leslie, (1915) 116 Ark. 433, 173 S. W. 191. But see Trinity etc. R.
Co. v. O'Brien, (1898). 18 Tex. Civ. App. 690, 46 S. W. 389, in which liability was
conditional on negligence, with both of which compare The Lord Derby, (1883) 4
Woods 247, 17 Fed. 265.
6
8White v. Steadman, [1913] 3 K. B. 340; Lunch v. Richardson, (1895) 163
Mass. 160, 39 N. E. 801, 47 Am. St. Rep. 444; Hosmer v. Carney, (1920) 228 N. Y.
73, 126 N. E. 650; Artificial Ice Co. v. Martin, (1936) 198 N. E. 446, holding that
contributory negligence is a defence. See also 20 Columbia Law Review (1920),
at p.6489.
Decker v. Gammon, (1857) 44 Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99; Field v. Viraldo,
(1919) 141 Ark. 32, 216 S. W. 8; Page v. Hollingsworth, (1855) 7 Ind. 317; Assgus
v. Radin, (1820) 5 N. J. L. 815, 8 Am. Dec. 626; Morgan v. Hudnell, (1895) 52
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In a large number of jurisdictions, statutes have eliminated the necessity
for scienter in any event, especially with reference to harm done by dogs,
thus putting the possessor of such animals in the same position, as to risk
of liability, as the possessor of wild beasts."5
ESCAPE OF DANGEROUS

SUBSTANCES

The great case of Rylands v. Fletcher" firmly established in English
law the rule that one who collects for his own purposes upon his own land
Ohio St. 552, 40 N. E. 716; 49 Am. St. Rep. 741; Mosher v. Beale, (1890) 43 Fed.
358; Malone v. Knowlton, (1891) 39 N. Y. S. R. 901; Smith v. Garniro, (1920)
113 Wash. 368, 194 Pac. 375; Lee v. Burk, (1885) 15 Ill. App. 651; Lee v. Riley,

(1865) 18 C. B. N. S. 722, 144 E. R. 629; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., (1874) L. R.
10 C. P. 10.
Some cases apply a different rule if the plaintiff failed to maintain a statutory
fence as a result of which the animal came upon his premises. See Perry v. Cobb,
(1903) 4 Ind. Terr. 717, 76 S. W. 289; Scott v. Grover, (1884) 56 Vt. 499, 48 Am.
Rep. 814. And some cases seem to turn upon the nature of the basis for the plaintiff's
claim (the form of action) whether for trespass to land with consequential damages
or an action directly to recover for the harm sustained. See Beckett v. Beckett,
(1871) 48 Mo. 396; Dufer v. Cully, (1871) 3 Ore. 377; Low v. Barnes, (1911) 30
Okla. 15, 118 Pac. 389; Dunckle v. Kocker, (1851) 11 Barb. 387. But see Decker
v. Gammon, (1857) 44 Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99.
65These statutes are sometimes in general terms making the owner of the dog
or other animal designated liable for harm done and sometimes more specific, making
the owner liable for particular harm, e.g., killing of sheep. Almost without exception,
these statutes, although not expressly so stipulating, are interpreted to eliminate the
requirement of scienter (Brent v. Kimball, (1871) 60 Ill. 211, 14 Am. Rep. 35;
Stuber v. Gammon, (1896) 98 Iowa 228, 67 N. W. 105; Forsythe v. Kluckbohn,
(1913) 161 Iowa 267, 142 N. W. 225; Ballou v. Humphrey, (1811) 8 Kans. 219;
Bush v. Wathen, (1891) 104 Ky. 548, 47 S. W. 599; Carroll v. Marcoxx, (1903)
98 Me. 259, 56 At. 848; Calvin v. Parker, (1891) 154 Mass. 346, 28 N. E. 244;
Trampen v. Verhage, (1884) 54 Mich. 304, 20 N. W. 53; Kingston v. Towle, (1868)
48 N. H. 57; Jacobsmeyer v. Poggemoeller, (1892) 47 Mo. App. 560; Kleybolte v.
Buffon, (1913) 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N. E. 192; Cockfield v. Singletary, (1868) 15
Rich. L. (S. Car.) 240).
These statutes are generally construed strictly. Thus, if the statute is
applicable to "owners" of dogs, it applies only to owners and not to others who
harbour a dog (Alexander v. Crosby, (1909) 143 Iowa 50, 119 N. W. 717; Wormley
v. Gregg, (1872) 65 Ill. 251). They are not applicable to harm done by a mad dog,
since this risk was not the danger against which the statute was directed (Legault
v. Malacker, (1917) 166 Wisc. 58, 163 N. W. 476, 1 A. L. R. 1109; Elliot v. Herz,
(1874) 29 Mich. 202). If the statute specifies certain harms, there is no liability
for different, though similar damage, in the absence of scienter (Van Etten v. Noyes,
(1908) 128 App. Div. 406, 112 N. Y. S. 888; Osincup v. Nichols, (1867) 49 Barb.
145). But cf. Wright v. Pearson, (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 582.
66(1865) 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774; (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265; (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
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foreign substances which, although in their natural state containing no
serious or unusual potentialities for harm, are accumulated in quantities
so great as to create a grave threat of harm should they escape, is liable
for such harm in the event of their escape, irrespective of the care and
diligence employed to confine them. In that case Lord Blackburn relied
heavily upon the rule applicable to the excursions of straying cattle and
to personal injuries inflicted by dangerous animals. 7 Lord Cairns in the
house of lords thought "the principles on which this case must be determined appear . . . to be extremely simple". 8 None of the judges
regarded-the principle as a new one; it was merely an instance of the
principle of liability, independent of negligence or any other fault, for
the escape of chattels brought on to the land in circumstances which make
69

their escape dangerous to others.

In spite of the position thus taken by the judges in the exchequer
chamber and house of lords, efforts have been made to explain this rule
on other grounds. Thus, it has been pointed out that the defendants in
Rylands v. Fletcher were actually in a position in which they were responsible, on orthodox and established principles, for the acts of the contractors
and their servants who had constructed the reservoir from which the
67(1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 263.
68(1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
69Cf. also Judge Augustus Hand in Exner v. Sherman Constr. Co., (1931)

54

Fed. (2) 510, 80 A. L. R. 686: "Furthermore, the imposition of absolute liability is
not out of accord with any general principles of law. As Professor Holdsworth has
said: 'The dominant idea of Anglo-Saxon law' was 'that man acts at his peril.' (2

History of English Law, 42.

See, also, Pollock on Torts (10th ed.) 15).

Accord-

ingly, the earlier forms of action such as trespass and trespass quare clausum fregit
allowed recovery for a direct invasion of person or property without regard to fault.
After the later action 'sur case' arose, there was a growing tendency to excuse an

act causing damage if the defendant was without fault.

But, in trespass, fault

ordinarily remained a matter of no consequence, and even in cases of damage to the
person the early decisions prior to Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (60 Mass.) 292, seemed
to have imposed liability where there was no negligence. Dickenson v. Watson,
T. Jones, 205: Although liability for injury to the person has not in most instances
survived except where there has been fault, .there still remains absolute liability for
trespasses to real estate and for actionable wrongs committed by servants no matter
how carefully they are selected by the master. The extent to which one man in the
lawful conduct of his business is liable for injuries to another involves an adjustment
of conflicting interests. The solution of the problem in each particular case has
never been dependent upon any universal criterion of liability (such as 'fault')
applicable to all situations. If damage is inflicted, there ordinarily is liability, in
the absence of excuse. When, as here, the defendant, though without fault, has
engaged in the perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive
for use in his business, we think there is no justification for relieving it of liability,
and that the owner of the business, rather than a third person who has no relation
to the explosion, other than that of injury, should bear the loss."
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water escaped." ° It was conceded that there had been negligence on the
part of some of these persons. Again it has been ably contended that
liability in this case is merely a unique application of the law of nuisance." 1
The subsequent adherence of the English courts to the principle developed
in Rylands v. Fletcher, however, indicates that here is another instance of
conduct carried on at the peril of the actor.
Although in America there were early objections to this aspect of the
principle,7 2 there has been a noteworthy tendency toward its acceptance 7
and, indeed, very considerable extension. The rule has been applied in
7
California to substances not imported on to the land, but naturally there. 1
It has been applied in Kansas to impose liability for harm caused subsequent to the careful confinement and delivery of the substance in its
dangerous quantities to a third person. 7 The rule has been applied to
the accumulation of explosives for proper and legitimate purposes which
have been -accidentally discharged by forces over whom the defendant has
had no control.
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70

See Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. I, at p. 62; J. Smith, 'Tort and
Absolute Liability" in 30 Harvard Law Review (1917), at pp. 409-10.
71
Salvond on Torts (ed. 7), at p. 372.
72Losce v. Buchanan., (1873) 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623; Marshall v. Welwood, (1876) 38 N. J. L. 339, 20 Am. Rep. 394; Brown v. Collins. (1873) 53 N. H.
442, 16 Am. Rep. 372; Shrewsbury v. Smith, (1853) 12 Cush. 177; Livingston v.
Adams, (1828) 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 175; Gulf etc. R. Co. v. Oakes, (1900) 94 Tex. 155,
58 S. W. 999, 52 L. R. A. 293.
73
Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., (1878) 86 Pa. 401, 27 Am. Rep. 711;
French v. Center Creek Powder M'fg Co., (1913) 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S. W.
723; Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., (1931) 54 Fed. (2) 510, 80 A. L. R.
686, noted in 45 Harvard Law Review (1932), at p. 594; 80 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, at p. 924; Green v. General Petroleum Corp., (1928) 205 Calif.
328, 270 Pac. 952, 60 A. L. R. 475 as to which see Carpenter, "The Rule in Green
v. General Petroleum Corp." in 5 Southern California Law Review (1932), at p.

263; Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen M'fg Co., (1899) 60 Ohio St. 560,
54 N. E. 528, 71 Am. St. Rep. 740; Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, (1907) 29
App. D. C. 554, 10 Ann. Cas. 865, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 535; Wiltse v. Red Wing,
(1906) 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W. 114; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., (1891) 145
Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649, 14 L. R. A. 329, 27 Am. St. Rep. 694; State Highway Comm. v.
Empire Oil & Ref. Co., (1935) 40 Pac. (2) 355 (Kans.) ; Berry v. Shell Petroleum

Co., (1934) 140 Kans. 94, 33 Pac. (2) 953; Brady v. Cox, (1932)

48 S.W. (2) 511

(Tex. Civ. App.), semble.
74
Green v. General Petroleum Corp. (supra, n. 73).
75
Berry v. Shell Petroleum Co., (1934) 140 Kans. 94, 33 Pac. (2)

953.

A

statute in Kansas imposes on oil companies the duty to confine oil and salt water
and, at their peril, to prevent their escape. The court, however, based its decision
not only on the statute but on the previously adopted common-law rule.
76
Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co. (supra. n. 73). Judge Hand, in this
case, relied somewhat upon the analogy of the decisions which impose liability for
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THE PLACE OF LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN THE LAW OF TORT

A number of years ago it was suggested by Professor Jeremiah Smith
that the principle of liability without fault and the various instances
7
thereof might well be regarded as outside the province of the law of tort.
Notwithstanding the suggestion and the grounds therefor, it has been
uniformly regarded otherwise in Anglo-American law. This type of
liability, it is submitted, is capable of rationalization as applications of
fundamental principles of the law of tort.
There is no compelling reason why the province of tort law should
be confined to conduct which involves moral derilection. In fact, it has
never been so limited in the common law. There are persuasive reasons
for believing that in its origin liability for harm to persons and things in
English law was altogether independent of the fault of the defendant.
Action at peril seems once to have been the general rule. 8 It has been
by way of growth that the element of moral fault has been injected into
tort law as a condition to liability. The inclusion of liability without fault
as a part of the law of tort involves no embarrassment so far as analytical
harm to property and person by the accidental miscarriage of carefully conducted
blasting operations. It is to be noted that such cases are not within the scope of the
present discussion since the harm is directly caused by the deliberate release of the
destructive force by a human agency. The unintended character of the resulting
harm and the precautions taken by the actor to prevent it, however, make the
analogy forceful. See J. Smith, "Liability for Damage to Land by Blasting-The
Rule of the Future" in 33 Harvard Law Review (1920), at p. 542.
TTJ. Smith, "Tort and Absolute Liability" in 30 Harvard Law Review (1917).
at pp. 409, 421 if.
7
sSir W. Holdsworth, History of English Law (ed. 3, London, 1923, vol. II, at
pp. 50 if; J. H. Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History" in 7
Harvard Law Review (1894), at pp. 315, 383, 441 ; Selected Essays on the Law of
Torts, at p. 18; J. Smith, "Tort and Absolute Liability" in 30 Harvard Law Review
(1917), at pp. 241, 248. With all of which compare N. Isaacs, "Fault and Liability"
in 31 Harvard Law Review (1918), at p. 954; and P. H. Winfield, "The Myth of
Absolute Liability" in 42 Law Quarterly Review (1926), at p. 37. "Action at peril"
is, like the phrase "liability without fault", somewhat misleading. There seems at
no time in English law such liability imposed literally. There undoubtedly have
always been liability-limiting factors. Thus arbitrary limitations in theories of
causation obviously qualify the most rigid doctrine of legal liability. By "action at
peril" all that is meant is that moral fault is not a condition to liability in the first
instance. Innocent and even highly commendable conduct may become the basis of
legal responsibility even though the resulting harm is brought about through forces
and events over which the actor has no control. Thus, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the employment of another to perform service in itself socially
desirable, is tortious conduct. Under such an analysis the distinction between vicarious
liability and primary liability disappears.
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distinctions are concerned from the law of contract and quasi-contract. 79
Fault seems no more a necessary ingredient of tort law than of contract
law or its absence from quasi-contract.
Legal liability in tort involves four factors: first, the actionable character
of the defendant's conduct; second, the character of the plaintiff's injury;
third, the causal relation between the two; and fourth, the participation by
the plaintiff in bringing about his injury. Liability without fault is subject
to analysis in terms of these four factors quite as much as in case of any
other type of tortious liability.
(i) As to the tortious character of the defendant's conduct. To become
the basis of liability in tort, conduct must contain a threat of harm to
others. There is no instance of legal liability in tort at common law
based upon conduct which contains no foreseeable potentialities of danger
to others.8 0 In the case of intended harms such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and deceit the danger is obvious.
The defendant acts for the very purpose of invading the legally protected
interests of the plaintiff."' In the case of negligence, the definition of the
defendant's conduct indicates the foreseeable character of the resulting
harm. In the case of liability without fault, the same element is present.
The general propensity of cattle and other domestic animals to stray is
emphasized in the cases. Not only is it to be anticipated that cattle will
wander from their confinement if possible, but resulting harm from their
trespasses is also foreseeable. This, too, is given as one of the grounds
for the rule. In a leading case the absence of this factor in the case of
dogs and other small animals was the basis given for the distinction as to
such animals. "We can easily see why the law should hold the owner of
a horse or an ox responsible for trespass; any trespass by those animals
must cause some damage, even when the animal is merely wandering about
and eating what attracts it. Trespass by a dog is very different; a dog
following its natural propensity to stray is not likely to do substantial
damage in ordinary circumstances. '8 2 So, too, it is notorious that wild
animals, although confined for many years or even born in captivity,
involve a serious threat of harm to others in the event of their escape.
The same is true of many activities which involve the accumulation of
79See P. H. Winfield, The Law of Tort (Cambridge, 1931), at pp. 215-6, 242.
8OSee F. V. Harper, "The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts" in 7
N-otre Dame Lawyer (1933), at p. 468.
8
The defendant may be labouring under a mistake as to the identity of the
legally protected interests which he invades or as to the existence of the plaintiff's
interests. However, he intends the immediate results of his act and the resulting
invasion of such outstanding legally protected interests as there may exist.
8
2Buckle v. Holmes, [1926] 2 K. B. 125; 54 T. L. R. 89.
15
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large quantities of substances not naturally on land. In fact, all situations
in which liability has been imposed under the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher involve the accumulation of substances which, because of their
nature and quantity, create a definite risk to persons on adjoining land.
In all of these situations there remains, in spite of all reasonable precautions, an irreducible minimum of danger, and in this respect the character
of the defendant's conduct is tortious to the same extent as in any other
type of tort liability. As a matter of accurate analysis, trespass to land
and defamation should be classified as additional instances of liability
without fault rather than, as is most frequently the case, included among
intentional wrongs. In both instances the defendant acts at his peril and
may become liable even in the absence of an intention to cause harm or
negligence in so doing.
(ii) As to the character ofthe plaintiff's harmi.
No difficulty whatever appears at this point. The types of harm for which recovery may be
obtained under the principle of liability without fault are all items of
recovery in any other area of tort liability.
No unique interests are
protected under the doctrine of liability without fault. In the case of
liability for trespassing animals as well as harm done by wild animals or
by the escape of foreign substances accumulated on land, interests in the
physical integrity of the person and in property are given legal protection.
The range of interests which receive protection under this principle are
limited by the same conditions applicable to other cases of tort liability.
and no interest is protected here which does not also receive protection
under other rules of tort law.
(nii)'As to the causal relation between conduct and harm. It has seldom
been noted that the general rules of causation apply to all cases of liability
without fault in much the same way as in cases involving the negligence of
the defendant.8 3 Lord Blackburn pointed out in Rylands v. Fletcher that
the defendant was answerable only for "damage which is the natural consequence of its escape"."s He thereupon added that the land-owner would
not be liable in the event the water had escaped from the reservoir by an
act of God. A decision to this effect was subsequently rendered in the
exchequer division."s
A few years later immunity was also accorded
when the substance on the defendant's premises was shown to have
escaped by the wrongful act of a third person whose intervention in so
83
See F. V. Harper, "Liability without Fault and Proximate Cause" in 30
Michigan Law Review (1932), at p. 1001.
84(1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265.
s5Nicholls v. Marsland, (1875) L. R. 2 Ex. D. 1.
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doing was not the subject of reasonable foresight."' So, too, the unforeseeable intervention of an animal in causing the escape relieved the defendant from liability."
In the case of liability for trespassing animals, it is
held that cattle driven on to the plaintiff's land by an intermeddling stranger
does not make the possessor of the cattle liable, ss although if the stranger
releases the cattle and they subsequently wander on to the plaintiff's land
the possessor is liable.89 While the possessor of domestic animals is liable
for all harm directly attributable to the trespass of his animals,90 an unforeseeable intervening force for which he is not responsible will not
increase the extent of his responsibility.91 Again, he who keeps a wild
animal is responsible only within the ambit fixed by orthodox rules of
legal causation. The plaintiff's harm must be attributable both to the
fact of the defendant's possession and the vicious propensities of the
animal. Thus, a wild animal which is indigenous to the locality will not
subject his captor to liability for injury inflicted by it after it has escaped
and again become a part of the wild life of the particular locality. 92 So,
too, harm done by the escape of a wild animal which does not result from
its wild or vicious nature does not make liable the person from whose
3

possession or custody it escaped.1
86Bo.v v. Jubb, (1879)

L. R. 4 Ex. D. 76.

The principle of this case was subse-

quently
affirmed by the house of lords in Rickards v. Lothian, [1913] A. C. 263.
7
8 Carstairsv. Taylor, (1871)

L. R. 6 Ex. 217, per Kelly, C. B.

SSHartford v. Brady, (1874) 114 Mass. 466; 19 Am. Rep. 377.
89

Noyes v. Colby, (1855) 30 N. H. 143.
OTheyer v. Purnell, [1918] 2 K. B. 333 (defendant's sheep, while trespassing
on plaintiff's land, infected his flocks. Defendant held liable whether or not he knew
or should have known that his sheep were diseased) ; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., (1874)
L. R. 10 C. P. 10 (defendant's stallion, while trespassing on plaintiff's land, bit his
mare) ; Crawford v. Williams, (1878) 48 Iowa 247 (defendant's worthless bull
impregnated plaintiff's thoroughbred cow).
9
'Hollenbeck v. Johnson, (1894) 79 Hun. 499; 29 N. Y. S. 945 (defendant's
cow strayed on to plaintiff's premises and crushed the cover of an old cistern into
which the plaintiff, without negligence, fell. Defendant was liable for the trespass
and property damage although not liable for plaintiff's personal injuries.)
The
general principle of liability for harm by trespassing animals, includes harm to the
person as well as damage to property and the lack of notice of the owner of the
animal of its vicious nature is immaterial. See 32 Harvard Law Review (1919),
at p. 420, collecting cases.
92Mitchil v. Alestree, (1676) 1 Ventris 295; Bowlston v. Hardy, 2 Croke Eliz.
546; Brady v. Warren, [1900] 2 Ir. Rep. 632; Tentative Restatement of Torts, § 508.
93Scribner v. Kelley, (1862) 38 Barb. 14; Bostock Ferari Amusement Co. v.
Brocksmith, (1905) 34 Ind. App. 566, 73 N. E. 281, 107 Am. St. Rep. 260; Marsh
9

v. Koons, (1908) 78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N. E. 599, 16 L.. R. A. (N.S.) 647, 125 Am.
St. Rep. 688, 14 Ann. Cas. 621,
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All of these rules indicate that not only the character of the plaintiff's
injury but the manner in which he sustained it must be the materialization
of the general type of risk which made the defendant's conduct actionable,
and in this respect liability without fault follows the same patterns as
liability for tort in other respects.
(iv)

As to the plaintiff's participation in causing his harm.

In all

phases of tort liability the plaintiff may be disentitled to recover from one
whose tortious conduct has caused an actionable injury. This principle
manifests itself in a number of rules. He who consents cannot complain
of battery or trespass. He who participates in conduct prohibited by law
cannot recover for personal injuries. He who by his own negligence
contributes to his injury cannot, save in exceptional situations, recover
from a negligent defendant. He who knowingly subjects himself to
certain risks cannot claim protection therefrom by the person responsible
for the creation of the risk. The same principle is apparent in cases of
liability without fault.
Where statutes have so modified the common law as to require a landowner to fence out his neighbour's cattle,94 his failure to do so bars a
recovery for their intrusion, and no case has ever been found in which
one who consented to his neighbour's cattle pasturing on his land recovered
the loss caused thereby. In the case of personal injuries by wild animals,
while that form of contributory negligence which consists of mere inadvertence to the danger will not affect a plaintiff's right to recover,9" the
deliberate exposure by him to the risk of harm will prevent recovery. 6
This is analogous to the doctrine of assumption of risk in negligence cases
and the administration of the rule follows closely that observable in other
cases of liability. So, too, in situations to which the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher is applicable, what Lord Blackburn called the "plaintiff's default"
will bar recovery. This, too, may be likened to the doctrine of assumption
of the risk and is to be found in an interesting case in which both plaintiff
and defendant had accumulated the same dangerous substance on their
94

See supra, n. 40.
5Sinith v. Pelah, (1747) 2 Strange 1264; Sandy v. Bushey, (1925) 124 Me.
320; Fake v. Addicks, (1890) 45 Minn. 37; Muller v. McKesson, (1878) 73 N. Y.
195; Copley v. Wills, (1913) 152 S. W. 830 (Tex. Civ. App.).
9
GMuller v. McKesson, (1878) 73 N. Y. 195; Ervin v. Woodruff, (1907) 119
App. Div. 603, 103 N. Y. S. 1051; Guzai v. New York Zoological Soc., (1920) 192
App. Div. 263, 182 N. Y. S. 257; 233 N. Y. 511, 135 N. E. 897; Opelt v. Al. G.
Barnes, (1919) 41 Calif. App. 776, 183 Pac. 241; Lehnhard v. Robertson, (1917) 176
Ky. 322, 195 S. W. 441; Marlor v. Ball, (1900) 16 T. L. R. 239.
9
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land.

The escape from the one was held not actionable by the other.

7

Both parties had here engaged in the same type of tortious though socially
commendable conduct, and neither could complain because the other's
activity had resulted in harm to him.
SUMMARY

In conclusion, two generalizations seem justifiable with respect to
liability in Anglo-American law for harm done by chattels.
First, the governing principle in all cases is strict liability or liability
without fault. This proposition, of course, is qualified by certain arbitrary
limitations to the applicability of the principle. Thus, the general principle
does not apply to trespass of dogs and other small animals; liability
may be imposed, however, if the particular circumstances of a case disclose the possessor of such animals to be guilty of negligence. So too,
while certain animals, as for instance, bees, are not classed as wild and
vicious beasts which the possessor keeps at his peril, nevertheless a
particular possessor of bees may be liable for injuries to persons or things
if he is negligent in the manner and place of keeping.
Second, the general principle of strict liability is properly regarded as
liability ex delicto. It is not based upon a fiction of fault nor is it a
spurious form of vicarious liability. On the other hand, it need not be
regarded as sui generis. All the basic rational equipment of tort law is
applicable to this form of liability. All aspects of the application of the
principle may be subsumed under the major doctrines of liability for tort.
FoWLERI
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Eastern etc. Tel. Co. v. Cape Town Tramnways Co., Lt'd., [1902] A. C. 381,
and see Lake Shore etc. R. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co., (1910) 48 Ind. App. 584,
92 N. E. 989, 95 N. E. 596.

